



## The Notion of Life-World in Edmund Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology

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**Abstract:** *The goal of this paper is to provide an account of Edmund Husserl's notion of life-world and its place within his philosophy. We find Husserl initiating some novel insights. The most suggestive and fundamental among them is the idea of the life-world. The life-world is the state of affairs in which the world is experienced and lived. If we go through Husserl's last-phase manuscripts, especially those published under the title *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, we would find that in later years Husserl sought for a more primordial level of human experience, which he describes as the 'life-world'. The life-world is the immediate pre-reflective world in which we live. This is the rock-bottom of all our ideas about the world, including the ideas and theories of sciences. It is the pre-predicative, concretely given world. It is, however, clear that with this idea of the life-world Husserl tries to have a radical and solid foundation of truths. It is the sphere of pre-given, pre-predicative stuff. But it is very important to notice that, according to Husserl, the patterns of the life-world are also constituted by the transcendental subjectivity. As we try to catch hold of the notion of life-world, we stumble upon apparent inconsistencies. Some of his expressions give us the impression that the life-world is the ultimate basis upon which all truths of life and culture are to be erected. But on other occasions he speaks of an epochē by means of which the realm of the life-world is bracketed, and its structure is explained with reference to the constituting activity of the transcendental subjectivity. One question the most important aspect of Husserl's overall theory and the other reading threatens to undermine its claim to scientific rigour. Some commentators think that the discovery of the life-world and its historicity gives a death knell to Husserl's rigorous phenomenological adventure. What is problematic is historicism, which goes against any transcendental investigation. In the concluding section we will reconsider the issue of historicism and relativism and their relation to Husserl's ever-cherished project of transcendental phenomenology. Commentators have pointed out that in Husserl there are two different conceptions of the world that natural world and the life-world. They also think that the difficulties of constitutive phenomenology led Husserl to ultimately give up the course of transcendental phenomenology in the *Ideas*, and in his later conception of the life-world he came nearer to French existentialism. Our primary aim here will be to show that Husserl's use of the life-world does not imply his rejection of the ideal of*

*transcendental phenomenology. He has demonstrated that a transcendental philosophy can accommodate the compelling demand to take history seriously, without falling in the trap of hopeless historicism. In this paper we will try to establish that the theme of the life-world is an original addition to Husserl's phenomenology and that the theme of the life-world can go hand in hand with the radical transcendental project.*

**Keywords:** *Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology, Life-World, Phenomenological Epochē, Transcendental Reduction, Historicism.*

### Meanings of The Natural World in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology:

One of the central objectives of Husserl's phenomenology is the clarification of the meaning of the world. Husserl worked out the structures of the world in two stages—one, in the *Idea-I*, in connection with the phenomenological reduction, and the second, in the *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. In the *Ideas I*, we have Husserl's conception of the natural world. The natural world contains things and beings of infinite variety and infinite quantity. The natural world is the world of 'natural standpoint' that is, the standpoint from which human beings imagine, feel, will and act. For a human being, immersed in the natural attitude, the world is there, spread out in space endlessly and in time becoming and become, without end. The world is the sum-total of things and includes corporeal things, animals and fellow human beings (like myself), each of which is an individual. I may attend to them; I may not, though they are there immediately for me. I find the world before me with value character, such as pleasant or unpleasant, agreeable or disagreeable, beautiful or ugly and so forth. Husserl says, "We begin our considerations as human beings who are living naturally, objectivating, judging, feeling, willing in the natural attitude."<sup>1</sup> The world in which I live; manifold branches of knowledge, people and things around me all these constantly present to me different experiences. The way one look at the world around is the natural standpoint. From the naturalistic viewpoint the world does not simply exist, it is rather seen as

existent, thought as existing, perceived as real. Consequently, the 'general thesis', the universally fundamental doxic positings (acts of believing) of the world is not a blind prejudice, an innate or acquired habit. On the contrary, all the habits formed in a man or acquired in the course of his life, belong to him as a man who already stands on his belief in the world, and is aware of himself as one existent object among others. The ego lives in a world, i.e. being in the world. It is an inborn attitude of mind which we are not normally conscious. Husserl felt that pure phenomenological analysis could not be achieved until and unless there was a complete disconnection of the mind from the objects of the world. The thesis of the natural attitude is more fundamental than the thesis of such other standpoints, as, for example, the arithmetical standpoint. When I adopt the arithmetical standpoint, the arithmetical world is there for me. But "The arithmetical world is therefore me only if, and as long as, I am in the arithmetical attitude."<sup>2</sup> Whereas, the natural standpoint and its corresponding world remain before and after we have adopted the arithmetical standpoint. When I am busied with the arithmetical world natural world does not vanish; it remains in the background. Their connection lies in their common relation to the ego who can freely direct the glance to one or the other. We find that in the *Ideas I*, several senses of the world are distinguished. They are the natural world, the world as available, the world as reality, the world as horizon, the surrounding or environing world, the world of values, of goods, of practical interest, the psychophysical world, the inter-subjective world, the world as horizon, the world as correlate of consciousness, the world as unity of meaning and the world as constituted being. For instance, from Husserl's notion of the natural world, one arrives at an insight into the necessary character of his conception of the world as co-relate of consciousness. Thus, the general characteristics of the natural world of natural attitude are as follows: 1) The world is a fact-world. 2) The world is one unbroken world. 3) The world is the surrounding world. 4) The world exhibits a horizon structure. 5) The world is a world of values. 6) The world persists through the whole course of our life of natural endeavor. 7) The world is one continuous world. 8) The world is an inter-subjective world. The intention of the above description is to determine the most universal structure, the essence of the natural standpoint. The essence is what is called by Husserl the general thesis of the natural standpoint.

**Phenomenological *Epochē* or bracketing:** The first and foremost methodological principle of phenomenology, according to Husserl, is that it must

be free from presuppositions. Husserl says, "It demands the most perfect freedom from presuppositions and, concerning itself, an absolute reflective insight."<sup>3</sup> In our foregoing discussions we have indicated that the belief in the natural world is a dogma, a prejudice. Phenomenology, which aims at investigating basic structures of phenomena as they really are, cannot succeed unless and until the investigator gets rid of this natural attitude. In order to get rid of this prejudice Husserl proposed a radical method and called it the phenomenological *epochē* or reduction. It is a methodological tool, and also a phenomenological tool. Husserl takes the phenomenological reduction or *epochē* to be his greatest 'discovery'. The question now arises: Why the *epochē* is introduced at all? What is the motivation behind it? Phenomenology is the systematic study of phenomena as such from a neutral point of view. Phenomenology is a radical method of philosophical investigations and an enquiry into the meaning of the world. Husserl develops it to satisfy the Cartesian ideal of grounding knowledge on absolute self-evidence. But as soon as he endeavours to enquire into the meaning of the world as such, he comes to realize that the true meaning of the world is lost in our hasty everyday attitude. Husserl described this attitude as the natural world attitude. But such a presumption, as a matter of fact, has been the source of misconceptions in scientific and philosophical enterprise. Admittedly, the task of the philosopher is to enquire into the meaning and truth of the world. Now, if the world is thus taken for granted unquestionably, the task of the philosopher becomes pointless. The assumption of what is to be proved leads the philosopher to go within a circle. In the history of philosophy we meet with philosophers who profess to demonstrate the reality of the world. But their efforts did not succeed, as they tacitly presumed the reality of the world which they otherwise wanted to prove. Husserl professes to break this circle of natural world attitude, and thereby to have a radical beginning for philosophy. He emphatically asserts that if we, as philosophers, want to uncover the world, we must keep ourselves free from the natural-world-belief. We must start afresh and only then could we achieve the ideal of radical beginning. We have seen that, as it applies to the natural standpoint, is to turn our attention away from the objects in the natural world so that we can focus on those fundamental evidences on which the natural beliefs of these objects are based. Husserl calls the *epochē* as something quite unique. The *epochē* does not involve a denial of the world. Husserl compares his *epochē* with Descartes' programme of doubt and says that the phenomenological *epochē* is not a temporary affair. It remains operative throughout the whole

course of transcendental phenomenology. Husserl has used a variety of words to characterize the practice *epochē*: disconnecting, setting out of action, bracketing. What result is achieved by Husserl's radical abstention (*epochē*) from the natural attitude? He becomes aware, for the first time, of transcendental subjectivity and perceives it as the origin, support, and foundation of all meaning. The natural attitude is presupposed by science and day to day life. The 'phenomenological attitude' consists of a stepping back from the natural attitude without denying it, for investigating the very experiences of the world. The givenness of reality, the way in which reality is given to experience is the subject matter of investigation. To Husserl, intentional experience give meaning to the essence, the Phenomenon as meant. The essence of consciousness is pure consciousness which is arrived at by excluding the natural attitude. The natural attitude is presupposed by science and day to day life. In order to reach this goal, he introduced the method of phenomenological description assisted by the methods of *epochē*, eidetic variation and phenomenological reduction. Edmund Husserl spoke of a presuppositionless phenomenology. In that respect all presumptions are to be removed so that the pure phenomena can be given.

**Transcendental Subjectivity:** It is found that Husserl speaks of types of 'reductions' such as 'philosophical', 'psychological', 'eidetic', 'phenomenological' and 'transcendental'. Now of all the reductions the transcendental reduction is at once the most important of Husserl's methodological devices. The revelation of the ego and its acts, purified of all empirical elements, is called transcendental reduction. It leaves only the pure or transcendental ego and its pure acts. By 'transcendental' he emphasizes that the reduced consciousness transcends the world to be its foundation. The pure Ego is the transcendental subject, and is the source of all meaning. Through the application of the *epochē*, as we have just seen, the world of the natural standpoint has been reduced to the status of a 'world-in-brackets'. Divested of the dimension of reality, this world can no longer serve as the ground, or presupposition, for human theory and praxis, but must be seen as having reality only insofar as it is an appearance for consciousness. The aim of the *epochē* is to discover a field of essential knowledge, knowledge which is unconditional, and independent of the empirical facticity of the natural world. Hence, within the *epochē* is retained, not natural (empirical) consciousness and its world, but what Husserl terms transcendental consciousness or transcendental subjectivity. It is important to note that Husserl separates this transcendental consciousness from our

ordinary (natural world) conception of consciousness as the empirical human ego. In the world prior to the *epochē*, the human psyche exists both as part of the content of that world, and as the subject of all possible world-experiences. Since both these roles, as part of the natural world, have been bracketed, the consciousness which remains as a field for phenomenological study cannot be psychological consciousness. Husserl distinguishes between the transcendental ego and the human ego and gives primacy to the former as the constitutor of the later. The world, for Husserl, is a product of the Transcendental Ego's constitutive intentionality. The transcendental Ego is the subject for the world. Husserl argues that although one's ego is alone absolutely certain, it cannot have experience of the world without being in intercourse with other egos. It must be a member of a society of monads. The transcendental subjectivity is responsible not only for the meaning or sense, but it is consciousness for which there is a world. Husserl criticizes Descartes for his failure to take this transcendental turn, the pure sense of the transcendental *epochē* and consequently, his failure to penetrate the proper domain of philosophy the transcendental level. Husserl's technique of transcendental reduction, leads him to the apodictic or absolutely certain evidence of transcendental subjectivity and to know it as the ultimate origin of all meaning and being. There is a real sense in which Husserl's project may be said to be world-affirming, since the origin of the world is accounted for by the constitutive intentionality of the non-worldly transcendental subjectivity. The procedure called transcendental reduction is a mental one, a technique for discovering the structure of consciousness and its constitutive relation to the world. Husserl's method of bracketing the world (and the human ego as part of the world) is meant, ultimately, to conserve the world or to include it in the totality of Being. In the philosophy of Husserl the problem of the world's origin is solved by locating all creativity, all power of constituting entities, in transcendental subjectivity. His method of *epochē* though it brackets the natural world in order to focus attention on consciousness itself, does not aim at the elimination of world-consciousness. It retains the world as a constituted entity in consciousness, and views the nature of consciousness as intentional. Husserl's aim seems to be to discover the source of apodictic certainty in knowledge. His search for the absolute foundation of knowledge leads him progressively deeper and deeper into subjectivity. He brackets his individuality and considers himself as an essentially epistemological subject, a transcendental ego. Now the question is: what remains after the execution of such an *epochē*? In other words, what is

the outcome of the *epochē*? He declares: “I must lose the world by *epochē*, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination.”<sup>4</sup> All these lead us to conclude that the transcendent world can be given to us only as correlate of consciousness and that consciousness is the only region of Being. The world indeed exists, but it exists through a dispensing of sense of meaning which presupposes a sense giving consciousness as its ground. This pure structure of consciousness articulates the Cartesian formula of the cogito into the tripartite formula of Ego-Cogito-Cogitata. Husserl criticizes Descartes for failing to realize to the fullest extent the implications of the absoluteness of the Cogito. Descartes fails to take the transcendental turn.

#### **Galileo Galilei’s Mathematization of Nature:**

Husserl identifies Galileo as the major figure in the process of mathematization, which he also calls Galileo’s mathematization of nature. What is the implication of this mathematization of nature? It is historically interesting to note that Galileo inherited ‘pure geometry’ from the Greeks as the science which provides exact and objective knowledge for its domain of objects. In our encounter with the real world we face the problem of subjective relativity of the appearances. It is the task of science to overcome this relativity. Now, pure geometry is related to the world in the sense that it can be seen as originally arising out of the practical needs of accurately surveying land and, as a matter of fact, its theoretical formulation always applies back to the real world. Galileo sees that it is so because the real world that is given to us in experience carries with itself instances of what is dealt with successfully in the science of geometry. Galileo then proposed that exact and intersubjectively valid knowledge can be attained, if the real objects of the world are considered as examples of geometrical entities. Every physical object thus is to be regarded as object which can be read in terms of geometrical shapes and properties. It is to be seen as supplying us with information, about nature as it shares in the exactness and universality of pure geometry. Galileo saw through this that “wherever such a methodology is developed, we have also overcome the relativity of subjective interpretations, which is, after all, essential to the empirically intuited world”<sup>5</sup>. It is under the influence of Galileo that the life-world in which human being are in immediate contact with the things of the world has been replaced by the objectively true world of the sciences. The universe of science is a network of ideal constructs. Its conceptions are those of the mathematical sciences. But the life-world is experience on the individual and the social level. The objects appear with their color, smell, etc. These qualities are

experienced in our sensation and perception. The world of the sciences is opposed to the individual’s life-world. But science wants to transcend the individual and social worlds. The mathematical method of the physical sciences was a critical reflective method. In this way the objective ideal world is derived from the life-world. Husserl points out that sciences need a foundation. This foundation is the experience of the life-world. The life-world theme has drawn our attention to the abstractions of sciences, which have a role to play also in the development of naturalistic world. We are now asked to go back to the primordial level of our lived experience in which the world and objects are intermixed. So we have to return to the life-world and elucidate its role in the constitution and development of the science. It is clear that Husserl becomes increasingly conscious of the distinction between the primordial, pre-theoretical human experience and the world of scientific reality. Husserl is drawing our attention to this unsatisfactory state of affairs where science and, under its impact, philosophy also is becoming completely cut off from the primordial, pre-reflective human experience. This idealization of nature in what is known as natural science started with Galileo in the West and it has become more and more mathematicized. But idealization presupposes materials to be idealized, a foundation on which the sciences stand. Husserl’s firm insight towards the end of his philosophical career identifies in the *Lebenswelt* the foundation of the sciences, natural and social, and studies of culture and religion etc., and in the evidence of common experience. This finding of Husserl emphatically asserts that all theoretical truth -logical, mathematical and scientific - finds ultimate validation and justification in evidences which concern occurrences in the *Lebenswelt*. For the ultimate clarification of the universe of science, one has to turn to the *Lebenswelt* which plays a vital role in the construction and constitution of science.

#### **Meanings of the life-world in the Crisis:**

In the *Crisis* Husserl renews the problem of the world from a different perspective. In the *Ideas-I* the world is characterized by him as the natural world. It is the thesis, the fundamental doxic basis on which it grounded the total attitude of a man as a natural human being. In the *Crisis* Husserl replaces the concept natural world by the new concept life-world. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* gives the impression that in the later years of his philosophical career Husserl sought for a more primordial level of experience in order to capture the true and precise field of inquiry. This level of experience is called by Husserl as the life-world. But

what lies behind Husserl's move to the life world phenomenology? What had been the factors that led him to initiate a novel approach of the life-world? The most off-hand answer is: Husserl introduced the idea of the life-world to meet the challenge of the crisis of the than science. To what extent is the concept of the life-world new? If we take a curious look at the whole body of Husserl's texts, both earlier and later, we could explore the repeated use and novelty of the theme of the life-world. Having studied the relevant texts it seems that the concept of the life-world goes much beyond Husserl's earlier world-view. At this point, one may well wonder why Husserl now speaks of the life-world instead of the natural world. In what way is the life-world different from the natural world? Nevertheless, it is the *Crisis* which securely and systematically establishes the theme of the life-world on the philosophical map, and made it a central interest of phenomenology. Husserl decidedly wants here to return to the world of pre-scientific, pre-predicative, pre-reflective level of the world-experience. As the *Crisis* reads, this is the perceived world and 'the original ground of all theoretical and practical activity'<sup>6</sup>, 'the constant ground of validity'<sup>7</sup>, 'the source of self-evidence'<sup>8</sup>, and 'the source of verification'<sup>9</sup> and that which 'constantly exists for us'<sup>10</sup>. Not only that, it is also 'the world of all known and unknown realities'<sup>11</sup> in which everything has 'a bodily character'<sup>12</sup> and in which we ourselves live 'in accord with our bodily, personal ways of being.'<sup>13</sup> It is also said to be 'the realm of something subjective which is completely closed off within itself, existing in the way, functioning in experiencing, all thinking, all life, thus everywhere inseparably involved.'<sup>14</sup> It requires little reflection to see that all these characterizations do not reflect a single comprehensive meaning of the life-world theme. Rather these characterizations leave us with ambiguities and paradoxes. According to commentators, Husserl has assembled under one title a number of disparate, and in some cases apparently incompatible, concepts. Needless to repeat that Husserl has come to the idea of the life-world by contrasting it with the world as envisaged by the theoretical attitude of the scientists, and as such the life-world is decidedly pre-theoretical. We may, however, regard the scientific-cultural world as belonging to the life-world in the sense that the latter is pre-supposed by the sciences. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* was Husserl's last work which he himself prepared for publication before his death. It remained unfinished though. Nonetheless, it is the work which has attracted more critical attention than any of his other works. For, although it was conceived of as an 'introduction' to phenomenology - as was also

the case with *Ideas I, Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Cartesian Meditations - The Crisis* obviously contains something completely new inasmuch as it documents the often discussed 'turn' in Husserl's later philosophy. According to some Husserl scholars, this 'turn' evidently cannot but mean Husserl's turn away from transcendental phenomenology. What does that word 'life-world' mean? The combination of those two words is intriguing but not surprising. It was Wilhelm Dilthey, the noted historian-philosopher, who centered his philosophy on the notion of life. The life is not a mere biological concept. It encompasses the entire external, physical and socio cultural environs of human beings. Hence, we must remember the contribution of Dilthey and there are enough reasons to presume that his philosophy of life plays an important role in Husserl's formulation of the content of the life-world. However, it was Husserl, who first used the integrated concept *Lebenswelt*, conjoining the concept of life, which we all experience, and the concept of the world. It shows the inalienable interconnection between our lives and the world we inhabit. We cannot conceive of our life apart from this world, nor can we conceive of the world apart from the perspective of any living beings. Husserl, particularly in his later days, endeavoured recovering this forgotten meaning of life and the world. A new mode of investigation, therefore, comes to be necessary. Husserl draws our attention that in this move science forgets what remains at the base, forgets from which it abstracts and of which it is interpretation, viz., the world of our immediate sense-experience. Husserl in his last investigations endeavours to recover this forgotten stratum and to accomplish this he introduces the life-world theme. But it is not legitimate to conclude that Husserl's life-world phenomenology represents nothing but an attempt to respond to a particular historical situation. The crisis theme, along with the historical reflections made in *Crisis*, although has an eye on the then historical situation, constitutes a systematic introduction to philosophy itself.

**The life-world and its relationship to transcendental phenomenology:** The concept of the life-world has added a new dimension to Husserlian Phenomenology. Husserl's concern for history expresses itself in the last phase of his philosophical investigations, and this concern comes to the fore with his newly popularized idea of the life-world. Husserl became increasingly concerned with history and historicity in the last phase of his thought. This diversion is somewhat surprising, as it apparently goes beyond his hitherto followed method of transcendental phenomenology. We have found Husserl as a totally

absorbed philosopher speculating in a radical way, a thinker unaccustomed to history by taste and profession. Actually, his avowed essentialism, his search for necessary truths, his ontology of ideal objects, and his criticisms of historicism and philosophy of life -all these stand against the possibility of a philosophy of history. But as soon as we read a few pages of the *Crisis*, we find Husserl illustrating the need for historical and critical reflections, the need for incorporating historical reflections into phenomenological investigations in order to attain maximum clarity in understanding. As a matter of fact, his earlier investigations do not give any prior hint of the turning of his phenomenology into the direction of history. On the contrary, we found Husserl raising his voice against historicism. But in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* Husserl wanted to provide a new way of introducing phenomenology and of grounding and justifying its historical necessity. What is suggested is this: Consciousness is by nature temporal. It is an ongoing unity that binds all the successive living moments by the thread of sense. Bit by bit, by overlapping moments in time, the expression of a moon, and the sense of a piece of red guitar, the blue of the sky, the aesthetic sense of a work of drawing, etc. get constituted. According to Husserl, Consciousness is temporal with a three-fold horizon of instantaneous retention, protention and presentation. Husserl insists that this notion of temporality constitutes the core-theme of historicity. Husserl is not bothered in such external history. His concern is with inner history. Husserl calls this intentional history, which is communalized with other persons, constitutes the genuine sense of human history. This can be delineated with reference to the theory of intersubjectivity. In other words, if the social dimension of the individual's experiences is then combined with the dynamic aspect of the conscious life, the full-fledged historicity of transcendental subjectivity comes to light and its cumulative character points to the historicity of the other individuals. The introduction of the life-world theme in the *Crisis* confirms the necessity of historical reduction. However, with the introduction of historicity in connection with the life-world Husserl no doubt introduces a new methodological element into his phenomenology. In his book *Experiment and Judgment* Husserl introduces another methodological element, i.e. historical reduction. However, this historical reduction is different from other modes of reduction. We realize Husserl's suggestion that a genuine historical reduction is necessary to get hold of the immediacy of the life-world. But still it remains to be understood how the possibility of transcendental

phenomenology is therewith vindicated. If we put aside the excess of historicism, the method of historical reduction might give us some help in the transcendental project. We have seen that our procedure of historical reduction is based upon the recognition of historicity. This notion of reduction would consist in the attempt to make these prejudices explicit, hold them up to vision. The philosopher's aim is to discover a-historical truth in the sense that truth is not only valid for a particular period but in some way universally valid. Through the historical reduction one can operate the explicit awareness of historical context.

**Concluding Remarks:** We have seen in the discussion of the previous section that that Husserl takes historicity and history with philosophical significance, but simultaneously he integrates it with his ever respected project of transcendental phenomenology. In this section we want to show how transcendental reduction can go hand in hand with historical reduction, and again, how the project of transcendental phenomenology can be sustained. If we are capable to combine historical reduction with transcendental reduction, the life-world with its correlation to the transcendental subjectivity can have a necessary foundation. Otherwise the life-world may be taken to be only the pre-given, pre-predicative reality upon which the abstract entities of the sciences develop. Then it will remain wholly dissociated from the transcendental subjectivity, thus making Husserl's transcendental phenomenology a hopeless attempt. Husserl's opines that the patterns of the life-world are attained by the accomplishments of the transcendental subjectivity. Husserl's preoccupation with history, historicity and the life-world does not stand against the way to his ideal of rigorous philosophy. Husserl has amply demonstrated that Historical reduction is designed to free us from these pre-conceptions and prejudices handed down to us all the way through traditions. Husserl asserts that, this method of reduction makes us alert of our cultural heritage and helps us, at the same time, to become free from its captivity, making explicit what was otherwise hidden. Our experiencing of the world is considerably shaped by these historically inherited ideas and conceptions. It is significant to note that just as we cannot meaningfully speak of historical relativity of experiences unless we land upon an a-historical sphere of consciousness, so also we cannot make sense of experiences unless we recognize this aspect of minimal historicism. Husserl's return to the life-world through historical reduction means the overcoming of historically determined reflections of a thinker who experiences the world in terms of the categories of modern science. It is no gain denying that it is this

subjectivity that actually lays bare the elements of historicity. Temporality and historicity are essential structures of transcendental subjectivity. By admitting the historicity of life-world Husserl does not fall in the trap of hopeless historicism that takes something as valid only for a particular time. Husserl deemed that the historical enquiry not only tells us what we must avoid, but it also tells us that consciousness can never be conceived without them. The notion of historical reduction requires that conscious life is essentially engaged in a historical situation. We may conclude by saying that Husserl's conduct of history face to face transcendental phenomenology is an excellent example of philosophy of history. This suggests that historical reduction makes us aware of the failure of the modern science to attain the transcendental attitude, but when the obscurities of these objective abstractions are removed, we are able to find the essential structures of the transcendental subjectivity in its constitutive mode. So we can say that historical reduction cannot hurt a death-blow to the project of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

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